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CASS  R. SUNSTEIN*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Even twenty years after New York  Times Co. v.  Sullivan, 1  defa-
mation  continues to raise some  of the most vexing problems in all
of colistitutional  law.  Perhaps  this  should  be unsurprising.  Defa-
mation  cases  pose  an  unusual  conflict  between  two  categories  of
rights,  both with a  constitutional basis,  and both with significant
theoretical and popular support. On the one hand is the interest in
free speech. Fear of liability for defamation  may have  a significant
deterrent effect on free expression.2  On the other hand is the inter-
est in protecting  reputation.  Notwithstanding Paul v.  Davis, 3  the
reputational interest has always had4 and continues to receive pro-
tection5  as  part  of  the  "liberty"  protected  by  the  fourteenth
amendment. But if the interest in free expression is allowed to de-
feat  application  of state  libel  laws  in  the  great  range  of  cases,
reputational interests  will be bereft of protection.
In  retrospect, New  York  Times posed  a relatively  easy  case  in
terms of both of the relevant interests. It  will be recalled that the
action was brought by a'police  commissioner  in Montgomery, Ala-
bama, alleging errors in an editorial advertisement about mistreat-
*  Assistant Professor  of Law, University  of Chicago. A.B. 1975,  J.D. 1978, Harvard Uni-
versity. I am grateful to David P.  Currie, Richard  A.  Epstein, Frank H. Easterbrook, R.H.
Helmholz,  and  Geoffrey  R.  Stone  for  helpful  comments  on  an  earlier  draft.  Richard  A.
Hertling  provided  valuable research  assistance  and insightful suggestions.
1.  376  U.S.  254 (1964).
2.  See  Rosenbloom  v. Metromedia,  Inc.,  403  U.S.  29,  50-53  (1971)  (Brennan, J.); New
York Times  Co. v. Sullivan,  376  U.S.  254,  277-83  (1964).
3.  424 U.S.  693 (1976).  In Paul,  local police officials had distributed  leaflets containing the
names and photographs  of "active  shoplifters,"  one of whom was the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court  held that harm  to reputation  was  insufficient to invoke  the protection  of the  due
process clause.  Id.  at 712.
4. See  generally  Monaghan,  Of  "Liberty" and "Property," 62  CORNnLL  L.  Rav.  405
(1977).
5.  Since Paul  v. Davis, the Court has adopted a "reputation plus" test for liberty, but the
"plus" may be quite small. See Owen v. City of Independence,  445 U.S. 622  (1980); Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S.  480, 494  (1980).WILLIAM  AND  MARY  LAW  REVIEW
ment  of Martin  Luther  King,  Jr.,  and  his  followers  by the  local
police. The plaintiff was  a public official,  and  issues  of undoubted
public  import  were  involved.  If  the  comments  were  actionable,
there was  a genuine  risk  of deterring  discussion  of public  issues.
The commissioner's  office  also  necessarily  involved  high visibility.
Even  though  public  officials  want  to  maintain their  reputations,
the  demands  of  representative  government  require  a  certain
"breathing  space"  for speakers.'  Finally, no facts about the  com-
missioner's private life had been  disclosed  in the New  York  Times
advertisement. In weighing the reputational  interest against the in-
terest in free speech, the Court's decision  was  clear.
Subsequent  cases  have  posed  much harder  problems,  in  which
the first amendment  interest  seems less compelling and the coun-
tervailing  reputational interest much more powerful.  It  is to some
of these subsequent cases that Franklin and Bussel address them-
selves. The  authors  resolve most of the disputed cases in favor  of
the  speaker  and  against  those  asserting  reputational  interests.
They attempt, in brief, to use New  York  Times as the basis for an
attack on much of state libel law. Their claim  is that their conclu-
sions  are  not merely  compatible  with the  decision,  but that they
"seem to  flow necessarily  from constitutional principles."'7
I am  concerned  here  with both  methodological  and substantive
problems. How does one resolve the close cases that arise  after de-
cisions like New York  Times Co. v.  Sullivan? In this Commentary,
I suggest that the authors  are  unpersuasive  in suggesting  that ei-
ther the  New  York  Times  principle  or the rationale  on which  it
relies  provides  much  guidance  for the  cases  they  attempt to  re-
solve. The hard defamation  cases go far beyond New  York  Times,
and require resolution  of difficult issues about the purposes of the
constitutional  protection  of free speech.
II.  AWARENESS AND  FALSITY
A.  Allocating the Burden
Franklin and Bussel discuss two principal  issues. First, they ex-
6.  See New York  Times  Co. v. Sullivan,  376 U.S.  254,  272  (1964).
7.  Franklin & Bussel,  The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation:  Awareness and Falsity,  25
WM.  & MARY  L. REv.  825, 825  (1984).
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plore  whether  after  New  York  Times  Co.  v.  Sullivan, a  plain-
tiff-whether  public  or  private-has  the  burden  of proving  that
the  defendant  knew  that  his  statement  was  defamatory,  and
whether that burden must be carried by clear  and convincing  evi-
dence.  Such a  requirement  would  be  a significant  supplement  to
the New  York  Times requirement that the plaintiff show that the
defendant recklessly disregarded  or had knowledge  of the falsity of
the defamatory statement. Second, the authors examine  whether a
plaintiff must show, in all contexts, that the defamatory statement
is false. If so, the first amendment always protects true statements,
no  matter  how  damaging  the  disclosures;  damaging  statements
that are not subject to forensic proof of falsity are  also protected.
Franklin  and Bussel resolve  these  issues favorably  to defendants,
recommending  a general requirement of proof of defamatory intent
and also  suggesting  that the fact-opinion  distinction  be abolished
in favor of a test focusing on whether the statement in question  is
falsifiable. Both of these recommendations  carry substantial impli-
cations for defamation law.
Franklin and Bussel maintain that a requirement that the defen-
dant knew of the defamatory nature of the statement in issue "log-
ically stems  from.  . .New  York  Times."" The  argument is essen-
tially that the self-censorship  concern of that case applies fully to
statements  of whose  defamatory  character  the defendant  is  una-
ware. Fearful critics will avoid the risk of a lawsuit, thus generating
the chilling effect that has often proved so  important in constitu-
tional  discussion  of  libel  law.  In  the  authors'  view,  a  defendant
may  not  be  held  liable  for  a  defamatory  statement  even  if he
knows  it  is  false,  unless  he  also  knows  it  is  defamatory.  Conse-
quently,  a person  may circulate  a  deliberate  lie  about a  person,
public or private, yet remain constitutionally immune from a defa-
mation  suit  if he  does  not  also  know  that it  is  defamatory.  The
familiar  example  is  a  statement  that  Mr.  Jones  entered  a  hotel
room with  Ms.  Smith, when the  speaker  did not  know that  Mr.
Jones was  married  to someone  else.  Another example  would be a
statement that Jones  is a "fascist,"  or a "crook,"  when the defen-
dant intends to engage  in hyperbole, but not to defame.
Although  Franklin  and  Bussel  are  happy  to  follow  what  they
8.  Id. at 834.
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take to be the Supreme Court's lead in New  York  Times, they dis-
tinguish  Gertz  v.  Robert Welch, Inc.9 insofar  as it  holds that pri-
vate plaintiffs must be treated more sympathetically than plaintiffs
who  are public  figures. Here too, they argue, the national commit-
ment to the notion that we need "a very good reason to shift losses
from  the  plaintiff to the  defendant  when  the  crucial  behavior  is
speech" requires that the plaintiff-even  a private plaintiff-show
that the  defendant had knowledge  of the defamatory  character  of
his statement.'0  In addition, they claim that the extent of the first
amendment interest compels the plaintiff to discharge  that burden
by clear  and convincing  evidence."'
The  argument  proceeds  similarly  with  respect  to  the  second
principal issue,  the need  for proof of falsity. There  is a strong so-
cial  interest  in  allowing  communication  of  true  statements.  No
such interest, to be sure, applies to false statements. But ambigu-
ous statements and statements of opinion-those statements which
cannot  be  proved  false-do  not  fall in  the  same  category  as  un-
truths. They too  deserve  constitutional  protection  insofar  as  they
contribute  to vigorous debate.  Franklin and Bussel thus reach the
broad  conclusion  that all statements  that cannot  be  proved  false
are  entitled  to  constitutional  protection.  Under  this  approach,
there  is  no need  to distinguish  between  facts  and  opinions.  The
key test is falsifiability.
B.  The Relevance of New  York Times
These recommendations all have considerable appeal-especially
to those who  are firmly persuaded  by New York  Times Co. v.  Sul-
livan itself. But I  believe  that the  authors  are  mistaken  in  sug-
gesting that the recommendations  follow from that  decision.  It  is
not  difficult to  construct  the grounds  on  which  opposite  conclu-
sions might be urged, and to show that the conclusions are  consis-
tent with the New  York  Times reasoning  and result.
The first problem is whether  the first amendment  is satisfied by
a showing that the defendant acted with actual malice,  or whether
9.  418 U.S.  323  (1974).
10.  Franklin & Bussel, supra note 7,  at 846.
11.  See id. at 836-37.
12.  See id. at  855.
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the plaintiff must  also  show that the defendant was  aware  of the
defamatory character of his statement. Suppose, for example, that
a reporter  writes that she  saw the plaintiff enter a hotel  room at
night  with John  Smith.  Suppose  too  that the  defendant  admits
that she did not in fact see the plaintiff do any such thing, but that
the defendant did not know that the plaintiff was married to Jones
rather  than  Smith. The  defendant  has  acted  with  actual  malice
within the meaning of New  York  Times, but she was unaware that
her statement was defamatory.
There  are  two  problems  with the  view that New  York  Times
compels  a conclusion  that the defendant is in these circumstances
protected  from  a libel  action.  First, it is  surely  plausible  to read
the case  as balancing the relevant interests-protection  of reputa-
tion and reduction of chilling  effects  on the media-in a way that
is satisfied by the requirement  of actual malice  and that, for con-
stitutional  purposes,  allows  states  freedom  on  the  question  of
awareness  of  defamatory  content.  There  would  be  nothing  odd
about  a regime  under  which a necessary  and  sufficient  condition
for liability is that the plaintiff show the defendant's awareness  of
or reckless  indifference to the falsity of the statement. Under such
a regime, if the plaintiff can  show that the defendant  has made a
statement falling in that category, the defendant  assumes the risk
that she will be held liable if the statement turns out to be defam-
atory. In short, those who circulate  lies about others  may be held
liable if the lie happens  to be defamatory.
To be  sure,  such  a result  might produce  some  self-censorship.
But self-censorship  is not an intrinsically bad thing. It all depends
on  the  consequences,  good  or  bad,  that follow.  As  discussed  in
more detail below,"'  the argument here is that in this fairly narrow
category  of cases-actual  malice  but no knowledge  of defamatory
content-the incremental increase in self-censorship  has few disad-
vantages  and significant advantages.  People would be discouraged
from  circulating  false statements. The  resulting deterrence  would
apply to all false statements,  even if they are nondefamatory,  but
it is unclear  what is  wrong with that.
The authors' response  seems to be that this conclusion would be
anomalous  because  it would pose  an  intolerable  risk of a chilling
13.  See infra text accompanying notes  20-28.
1984]WILLIAM  AND  MARY  LAW  REVIEW
effect and would distinguish between the defendant's state of mind
with respect to falsity and with respect to the defamatory  charac-
ter of the statement.14 But the anomaly is hard to  see. Arguments
about  chilling  effect  operate  at too  high  a  level  of  generality  to
solve the particular question.  In the  abstract, they threaten to do
away  entirely  with  the tort of  defamation,  and  no  one  seems  to
want to  go  that far. The  question,  again,  is  whether  the  chilling
effect is good or bad in the circumstances.  Moreover, there is noth-
ing implausible  about a  distinction  between  the defendant's  state
of mind with respect to issues  of falsity and his state of mind with
respect to defamation.  One might reasonably believe that the New
York  Times result adequately protects the relevant  interest of the
defendant,  that the defendant  ought to be  forced  to  assume  the
risk  of defamation,  and that the  alternative result  would provide
inadequate  protection  of the  countervailing  interest in reputation.
The second  problem with the conclusion that all plaintiffs  must
prove  knowledge of the defamatory nature of the statement is that
it fails  to distinguish  between  public and private  plaintiffs  or  be-
tween  matters that are of public importance  and matters that are
not. As suggested  below, that distinction  is a natural outgrowth  of
New  York  Times.'
5
It is also  unclear  that New  York  Times justifies the  conclusion
that true statements  are  always  protected.  Suppose,  for  example,
that  a  magazine  publishes  a  private  fact  about  a  private  plain-
tiff-for example, that she  is a homosexual or that she  has cancer.
Suppose  too that the fact  is  one which  the  plaintiff has  carefully
attempted to keep  quiet, that disclosure  is  injurious  to the plain-
tiff's personal and professional relations, and that disclosure  is not
by  any objective  standard" 6  newsworthy  or related to a matter  of
public  importance.  Is there not a strong  argument that New  York
Times  Co.  v.  Sullivan has  absolutely  nothing  to  say  about that
case?  New  York  Times  Co.  v.  Sullivan stemmed  largely  from  a
14.  See Franklin  & Bussel, supra note 7, at 836-40.
15.  See infra notes  29-33  and accompanying  text.
16.  There  are familiar  difficulties  in generating  objective  standards  by which  to decide
newsworthiness. See, e.g., Rosenbloom  v.  Metromedia, Inc.,  403  U.S.  29  (1971).  But if the
judgment of the reporter is conclusive  on the matter, the necessary  public/private  distinc-
tion cannot  be  administered. In any event, the problem  is largely  one  of line-drawing,  and
here as  elsewhere the existence  of intermediate  cases  is no reason to abandon a distinction.
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conception  of the first amendment  akin to that popularized by Al-
exander  Meiklejohn. 17  The  underlying  notion  was  that where  the
affairs  of public  officials  are  involved,  it  is  important to assure  a
certain  amount  of breathing  space  for journalists.  That rationale
does not accord constitutional  protection to a writer who discloses
true but private facts about a private person not involved in public
affairs.' 8
Under  similar  reasoning,  one  might  urge that the first amend-
ment does  not protect all statements that cannot  be proved  false.
This  conclusion  flows  easily  from  the suggestion  that true state-
ments  are not necessarily  protected  by the first amendment. Bur-
ton v.  Crowell Publishing  Co.,'9  on which Franklin and Bussel rely,
is  a  good  example. At  issue  in Burton was  a  cigarette  advertise-
ment purporting  to show that the plaintiff-a private citizen-was
exposing his genitals,  and that the genitals were  deformed. Frank-
lin and Bussel urge that the court was wrong to conclude that the
advertisement was actionable."  But that conclusion hardly follows
from New  York  Times Co. v.  Sullivan. The  concern in New  York
Times was that seditious  libel and  analogous  doctrines  strike  "at
the very heart of democracy."2' No such concern justifies the posi-
tion taken  by Franklin  and Bussel with  respect to all  statements
that are not  demonstrably  false.  Some  such statements  will have
nothing to do with  seditious libel, or even with  democracy  in the
ordinary sense, at all. They will instead bear on mundane issues of
personal  privacy and reputation.  The  concern that underlies New
York  Times  is  minimal  or  nonexistent.  Moreover,  the  counter-
vailing  considerations-dealing  with  reputational  interests  and
personal  privacy-are extraordinarily  powerful.
What I have said so far does not mean that Franklin and Bussel
are  wrong  in their conclusions.  It  does  suggest, however,  that one
17.  See A. MEIKLEJOHN,  FREE SPEECH  AND  ITS  RELATION  TO SELF-GOVERNMENT  (1948),  re-
printed in A.  MEIKLEJOHN,  POLITICAL FREEDOM:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL  POWERS  OF  THE PEO-
PLE  1-89  (1965).
18.  In subsequent  cases, however,  the  Court has protected  speech  that is  at least some
degree  beyond this rationale. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.  469 (1975)  (dis-
closure of name of rape victim).
19.  82 F.2d  154  (2d Cir. 1936).
20.  See Franklin  & Bussel, supra note 7, at 867-68.
21.  Kalven,  The  New York  Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment,"  1964  Sup.  CT.  REV.  191,  205.
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needs  a  largely  independent  set  of arguments  to support the  ex-
pansion  in  coverage  that they  seek.  New  York  Times and  its ra-
tionale,  standing alone, fail to do the job.
III.  RESOLVING  HARD  CASES
How, then, does one resolve  the hard cases that arise after New
York  Times Co. v.  Sullivan? It  should come as no surprise to sug-
gest  that  these  cases  require  identification  of  the  rationale  on
which New York  Times was based. Let me reiterate, as a relatively
uncontroversial  working  hypothesis,  that  the  decision  rested  on
Professor  Meiklejohn's  conception  of the first amendment.22  That
conception is based on a particular understanding  of democracy-a
belief that democracy  consists of self-rule in the form of resolution
by the  citizenry  of important  questions  of  public  policy.23  "The
freedom that the First Amendment  protects  is  not, then,  an  ab-
sence of regulation. It  is  the presence  of self-government."24  That
conception  owes  a  considerable  debt  to  republican  principles  of
civic virtue. 25  The underlying  notion is that the political process  is
a forum for broad  deliberation  on public issues and that rights  of
speech and the press have a distinctive role to play in the delibera-
tive process  of which politics rightly  consists. 26  It  is that delibera-
tive process, above  all,  that the first amendment  protects.
It  is not difficult to see that this conception  of the first amend-
ment does not describe  the political  process as it  usually operates
in  the  United  States.  Broad  deliberation  tends  to  be  unusual;
power politics is the rule.2  The republican conception, therefore,  is
an ideal toward which the right of free speech is meant to pave the
22.  See supra note 16; see also Brennan,  The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Inter-
pretation  of the First Amendment, 79  HARV.  L. REV.  1  (1965).
23.  See  G.  WOOD,  THE  CREATION  OF  THE  AMERICAN  REPUBLIC  1776-1787,  at 53-60  (1966).
For a discussion  of this theme  under  many constitutional  provisions,  see Sunstein, Naked
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM.  L. REV.  - (1984).
24.  Meiklejohn,  The First Amendment Is  an Absolute, 1961 Sup.  CT.  REV.  245,  252.
25.  See H. STORING,  WHAT  THE  ANTiFEDERALISTS  WERE  FOR (1981);  W. SULLIVAN,  RECON-
STRUCTING  PUBLIC  PHILOSOPHY  (1982);  G.  WOOD,  supra note  23.
26.  See H. ARENDT,  THE  HUMAN  CONDITION  3-7 (1958).
27.  See,  e.g.,  R.  DAHL,  WHO  GOVERNS?  DEMOCRACY  AND  POWER  IN  AN  AMERICAN  CITY
(1961);  Stigler,  The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2  BELL.  J.  ECON.  &  MGMT.  Sci.  3
(1971).
28.  See supra note 27.
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way. In New York  Times, the Court was persuaded that the consti-
tutional commitment to this ideal required severe inroads on defa-
mation law insofar as it deterred speech directed at public officials.
The reason is familiar and obvious. To the extent that libel law can
be invoked  against popular  discussion  of public  issues,  there will
be much less discussion,  and the republican ideal  will be severely
jeopardized.  Under  this framework,  it is  not  difficult  to  envision
the  grounds  for  analyzing  the  issues  of  defamatory  intent  and
falsity.
A.  Defamatory Intent
The first question is whether proof of defamatory intent should
be required when plaintiffs are public officials or public figures. As-
sume, for example, that a reporter publishes  an article stating that
Robertson, a presidential  candidate, has taken certain positions on
issues  of public  concern.  Suppose  too that the reporter  is  either
recklessly  indifferent  to the truth or falsity  of the  statements  or
that he  knows that they are  false but publishes  them  anyway  in
order to increase  sales. Suppose,  finally, that the reporter  did not
know that the statements were  defamatory because the report was
published  well  before  the  candidate's  supposed  positions  on the
particular  issues  could  cause significant  damage  to the candidate.
The  positions,  for  example,  might relate  to an  issue that  became
sufficiently  important  to justify  a  damage  award  for  defamation
only after certain  events  had occurred in the outside  world.
What  social interest is there in protecting the reporter  in these
circumstances? Why should proof of defamatory intent be required
in  addition  to proof  of New  York  Times  actual malice?  At  first
glance, it is hard to see what is gained by requiring proof of defam-
atory intent. The argument, in short, is that once the plaintiff can
show  knowledge  of falsity,  or  reckless  indifference  to falsity,  the
defendant  ought to be forced to  assume the risk that the  speech
has a defamatory character.
There are two responses to this conclusion.  One  response would
be to emphasize that the system of litigation has an inherent risk
of error.29 As a result, true statements as well as false ones  will be
29.  See  F. SCmAuER,  FIEE SPEECH: A PmLosoPHIcAL  ENQUIRY  (1982).
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penalized. But if that is a problem, it infects the New  York  Times
standard as well. The actual malice standard, as it is currently ad-
ministered,  will inevitably catch some  speakers  who do not in fact
have the required state of mind. But few think that such possibili-
ties  justify  amending  the  New  York  Times  standard  to  make  it
more  protective.  In  any  event, if the  risk of judicial  error  is the
problem, it  is hard to see  why an  additional requirement  of proof
of defamatory  intent is the solution.
Another  response  would  be  to  argue  that at  least  some  state-
ments that would be protected by a requirement  of defamatory in-
tent ought to be protected. Here Franklin and Bussel refer to am-
biguous statements-claims  that Jones is a "fascist" or a "crook." 0
Such  claims  may  be  defamatory  within  the  common  law  of libel
because  a certain  percentage  of listeners  or readers  will  interpret
them literally. These appear to be the cases about  which Franklin
and  Bussel  are  especially  concerned.  But  such  cases  can  be  re-
solved  without  establishing  a  general  requirement  of  defamatory
intent.  First, the  relevant  speakers  may  not  have  actual  malice
within the meaning  of New  York  Times. When  a speaker  calls  a
public official a "fascist,"  he generally does  so without the requisite
knowledge  of falsity. The  term  is  ambiguous,  hyperbole  is  omni-
present in public debate, and such statements are rarely meant lit-
erally. This reasoning  is reflected in the  cases.3' If the  actual mal-
ice  standard  is  satisfied,  however,  the  statements  should  be
protected,  not with a defamatory  intent requirement, but under  a
kind  of "innocent  construction"  rule. If a  speaker makes  a state-
ment that is generally or frequently interpreted by -the  public in a
nondefamatory  manner,  it  should  probably  be  protected.  Unlike
the  rule  proposed  by  Franklin  and  Bussel,  this  approach  would
protect desirable speech without immunizing deliberate falsehoods.
In  sum,  I  do  not  believe  that plaintiffs  should  be  required  to
prove  defamatory  intent as well  as actual malice. First, such a re-
quirement  would  protect  speech  that ought not  to  be protected,
and it would remove a desirable chilling  effect. Second, the speech
that  ought  to  be  protected-hyperbole  or  ambiguous  state-
30.  See Franklin  & Bussel, supra note  7, at 866-67.
31.  See, e.g. Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6  (1970). But see Com-
monwealth  v. Canter,  269 Mass.  359,  168 N.E.  790  (1929).
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ments-can be protected either through the actual malice standard
itself or through a test that focuses on the objective meaning of the
statement  in question.
B. Private Plaintiffs and Truthfulness
The  New  York  Times  principle,  of  course,  applies  to  suits
brought by public  officials or  public figures. At least when  public
officials  are involved,  application  of common  law libel rules raises
genuine  constitutional  problems.  Such  problems,  in  general,  are
also raised when  one is dealing with nominally private citizens  ex-
ercising  significant  power  or  involved  in  issues  of public  impor-
tance-a possibility that suggests that the Court seriously misstep-
ped  in  the  Gertz case. 3 2 Those  not formally  associated  with the
government, of course, often play an important part in formulating
public policy.33  The test should focus,  therefore,  not on the  exis-
tence of a formal connection with the government, but on the rela-
tionship of the plaintiff and the controversy to matters  of public
significance.  When one  is dealing  with a private citizen  and an is-
sue of no public import, some of the important3 4 first amendment
concerns  drop  out. Under the first amendment, then, private citi-
zens  not engaged  in  public controversy need not prove  either  de-
famatory intent  or falsity.
Franklin and Bussel are somewhat ambiguous in urging that true
statements  are  always  protected  by  the  first  amendment.  Their
claim appears to be that a state may not constitutionally treat as
tortious statements that cannot be proved false-a conclusion that
would do away with a good deal of state tort law concerning rights
of  privacy.  That  conclusion  seems  unacceptable  in  light  of the
strong interest in both  privacy  and reputation  and the weakened
32.  Gertz v. Robert  Welch, Inc.,  418 U.S.  323  (1974).
33.  See,  e.g.,  C.  LINDBLOM,  PoLTcsS  AND  MARKETs  (1977);  Tushnet, Book Review,  1984
Wis. L. REv.  129  (reviewing M.  YUDOF,  WHEN  GovERNMENT  SieAKs  (1983)).
34.  The first amendment  is of course importantly  concerned  with things  other than self-
government, even  if  that concept  is  defined,  as  it  should be, in very broad terms. See L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN  CONsTrruTIoNAL  LAW  (1978); Shiffrin, Defamatory  Non-Media Speech and
First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REv. 915  (1978).  The autonomy principle,  for
example, means that the first amendment is at least applicable even when public issues are
not at stake. But it is impossible, I think, to formulate a coherent body of first amendment
doctrine without recognizing that whether speech involves public  affairs, broadly defined, is
highly relevant  to the extent  of constitutional protection.
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first  amendment  concerns  when  self-government,  even  in  the
broadest  sense,  is  not  plausibly  at  stake.  On  the  other  hand,
Franklin and Bussel may be urging only that the law of defamation
may not  be applied  to true statements-a  conclusion  that  would
leave  state law  protecting  rights  of privacy  unimpaired.  But  this
conclusion  also  seems  unacceptable,  for  the  label  that  a  state
chooses to use  should not matter in assessing  constitutionality.
On the other hand, when the plaintiff is a public official or pub-
lic figure,  or  a private  citizen  embroiled  in an  issue of public  im-
portance, the general rule ought to be that there can be no liability
for  statements  that cannot  be  proved  false.  The  interest  in  free
discussion  is sufficiently important to justify at least a strong pre-
sumption  against  allowing damages  for statements that cannot  be
shown  false,  and  the competing  interest  of the  plaintiff  is  suffi-
ciently  weak when false statements  are not at issue3 5
The only troublesome  cases arising  in this category involve  dis-
closures  that are  not  of genuine  public  interest.  Consider, for  ex-
ample, the disclosure of embarrassing facts about the private life of
an  actor,  an  athlete,  or perhaps  a low-level  public  official.  To be
sure, the likelihood that such disclosure will bear on issues of genu-
ine public import is increased when they concern a public official, a
private person involved  in public affairs,  or perhaps  even  a public
figure.  But it is  easy  to imagine  cases in  which  one  has gone  far
afield  from  the  New  York  Times  conception  of  what  the  first
amendment  is  about. In  such  cases,  I  believe  that  disclosures  of
private facts are actionable even if the plaintiff falls  within the ba-
sic protection of the New  York  Times case. Indeed, one might well
go  further  and  question  the  current  broad  definition  of "public
figures,"  under which first amendment protection has been applied
to bar recovery  by many who are not by any standard  engaged  in
the process  of governance."
IV.  CONCLUSION
It should  come as no surprise to find that one's view of the hard
35.  I  put to one  side the  important point that, under  the  cases, speech  is often  rightly
protected  even though  it  is falsifiable-as in the  hyperbole context.  "Fact" and "opinion"
thus operate  as labels  for  conclusions based on a host of considerations.
36.  See  Schauer, Public Figures,  25 Wm.  & MIARY  L. RE V.  905  (1984).
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cases that arise after New York Times will depend largely on one's
conception  of the underlying  function  of the first amendment. To
the extent that one associates the first amendment with the princi-
ples of collective self-determination, one  will be inclined to regard
private plaintiffs as altogether different from public plaintiffs. And
'although the line-drawing problem may be formidable, there seems
to be at least a core  of cases in  which the strongest sorts  of first
amendment  protection  should  not  attach.  The  existence  of hard
intermediate  cases is never a good reason for rejecting an otherwise
sensible  distinction.  Similar  considerations  make  me  unwilling  to
believe that New York  Times justifies a conclusion that statements
that cannot  be  proved  false  are  always  protected,  although  that
should be the general rule.
The  most difficult  issues  discussed  here  relate  to  the need  for
proof of defamatory intent in suits brought by public officials. The
danger  of a  chilling  effect  may  be  significant,  but  the  question
must  always turn on the  sort of thing that is.being  chilled. What
makes the defamatory intent problem- difficult is that it is possible
to imagine cases that fall on both sides of the line: those in which
one is chilling speech which there is no public or private interest in
promoting;  and  those  in  which  the  chilling  effect  is  imposed
against  statements  that,  although  false,  ought  to  be  permitted.
There  is, in addition, the familiar problem of the errors built into
the system of litigation. I have suggested that proof of defamatory
intent should not be required, and that one  can protect desirable
speech through other  means.
I conclude with one additional note. New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan was rightly decided and-perhaps more important-it rested
on  a conception  of the first amendment  that ought to command
widespread  support. But that conception  contains inherent limits.
In the hard  cases that arise  after New  York  Times, those  limits
occasionally  have  been  transgressed.  When  resolving  the  hard
cases,  it  is important  to avoid talk  of a  chilling  effect  in the  ab-
stract, or of the need to resolve  the general  conflict between the
interest  in  reputation  and the  competing  interest in  free  expres-
sion.3 7  Both interests are important; both are rightly accorded  con-
stitutional status. In such circumstances,  and in the hard defama-
37.  This is, of course, a reference to the methodology discussed by Ronald Dworkin in the
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tion  cases, the task is to focus  on the precise  nature of the harms
to the relevant  interests, and  on whether  the chilling  effect might
curb speech that we  have good  reason to protect.
essay  from which  this  Commentary  takes its title. See  R. DWORKIN,  TAKING  RIGHTS  SERI-
OUSLY  81-130  (1977).
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